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Abstract: In this study we investigated how treatment norms about antibiotic use 
affect a doctor´s decision to prescribe antibiotics. We also investigated the attitudes 
and behavior of the same physicians as private persons. We find that compared with 
ordinary citizens, physicians are more worried and more well-informed about 
antibiotic resistance and use, yet they consume more antibiotics and are less willing 
to limit their personal use of antibiotics. There is a strong correlation between a 
doctor´s decision not to prescribe and the treatment norms, i.e., the perception of 
the common choice among physicians considering antibiotics prescription and the 
guidelines of antibiotics use. We also find a strong connection between professional 
and private attitudes: Although physicians themselves on average use more 
antibiotics than the general public, those who are willing to abstain from using 
antibiotics as a private person are also more willing not to prescribe antibiotics to 
their patients.  
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Health experts point to the devastating health and economic consequences of 
uncontrolled antibiotic resistance. Estimations suggest that antibiotic resistance 
could become responsible for 10 million deaths annually by 2050 if left unchecked 
(O’Neill, 2014), and the economic consequences may become as severe as the 
financial crisis of 2008/2009 (Jonas et al., 2017).  
Since human antibiotic overuse is a key driver of antibiotic resistance (Goossens 
et al., 2005), changing the attitudes and behaviors of prescribers is at the heart of 
strategies to limit the problem. Attempts are being made to promote rational 
antibiotic prescribing by implementing antibiotic stewardship programs (Sanchez 
et al., 2016). However, for such behavioral interventions to be effective, attention 
must be paid to the multitude of factors that govern prescription decisions by 
medical doctors (Bradley 1992; Freeman & Sweeney 2001; Natsch & Van Der 
Meer 2003; Broom et al., 2015).  
We consider the relationship between the doctor and the patient as a principal-
agent relationship. In the simplest version of this the doctor – the agent – makes 
informed decisions so that the health/welfare of the patient – the principle– is 
maximized (Mooney & Ryan 1993). According to Hippocratic ethics, the health of 
their patients should be the sole objective of doctors (Kesternich et al., 2015). In 
practice, however, other factors also play a role (Mooney & Ryan 1993). Economic 
profit of doctors is documented to influence not just doctors’ decision-making in 
general but also their antibiotic prescribing specifically (Iversen 2000; Currie 
2014). In this paper we focus on yet another reason why the interests of the 
“principle” may be side-stepped. Because of the collective nature of the antibiotic 
resistance problem, prescription of antibiotics is an example of decision-making 
that compels doctors to balance the health benefit of the individual patient against 
broader public health interests (Roope et al., 2019). This balancing act gives leeway 
for professional discretion and creates an ethical dilemma that needs to be resolved 




Many professions enjoy ample space for discretion in their daily work. Michael 
Lipsky defines frontline bureaucracy workers as ”[p]ublic service workers who 
interact directly with citizens in the course of their jobs, and who have substantial 
discretion in the execution of their work” (Lipsky, 2010 p. 3). Street-level 
bureaucracy theory concerns how judgments, convictions, and decisions can be 
described and explained as well as how they contribute to outcomes.  
The prior research that investigates medical doctors’ antibiotic prescription 
behavior points to the relevance of analyses of discretion also in medical practice, 
as this literature shows the relevance of non-medical factors for antibiotic 
prescribing. For example, many studies demonstrate the relevance of social factors 
for antibiotic prescribing. These factors include the wish of doctors to sustain a 
good relationship with the patient (Butler et al., 1998; Sanchez et al., 2014) and that 
the physicians believe that patients expect a physician to prescribe medications 
(Cockburn and Pit, 1997; Macfarlane et al., 1997; Coenen et al., 2002; 2006; 
Björkman et al., 2011; Lopez-Vazquez et al., 2012).  
In this paper we make use of an online panel survey with a hypothetical 
prescribing decision case to study factors linked to Swedish doctors’ decision to 
treat tonsillitis with antibiotics. We contribute to the existing literature by paying 
attention to the way in which professional norms and private attitudes shape how 
doctors handle the prescribing dilemma. We also control for experience with 
prescribing antibiotics and concern about antibiotic resistance among doctors. 
Professional norms are conceptualized and empirically measured in two separate 
ways. First, we look at the perceived descriptive social norms regarding antibiotics 
among peer physicians. In order to measure this we asked doctors about how they 
think colleagues would decide in the tonsillitis hypothetical prescribing dilemma. 
Second, we look at the professional prescriptive norm set by written clinical 
treatment guidelines about “best practice” for antibiotic treatment. Treatment 
guidelines are often referred to as core aspects of antibiotic stewardship programs 
(Sanchez et al., 2016; Dyar et al., 2017). Thus, we are interested in the extent to 
which doctors self-reported adherence to antibiotic treatment guidelines is linked to 
the decision in the hypothetical tonsillitis prescribing dilemma.  
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There are many barriers to the implementation of treatment guidelines in clinical 
practice (Carlsen et al., 2007). Prior research has documented that norms among 
peers influence doctors’ prescribing decisions (Carthy et al., 2000) and that 
prescription of antibiotics is by no means different in this respect (Charani et al., 
2011; Broom et al., 2016). Moreover, previous studies have shown that the 
influence of senior colleagues on antimicrobial prescribing behavior is likely to be 
significant (Cortoos et al., 2008). One problem with the implementation of 
guidelines is thus that they tend to fall short when they contradict existing non-
written social norms among peers (Burges et al., 2003). For example, in their study 
of antibiotic prescribing by hospital doctors in Australia, Broom et al., (2016) found 
that social norms regarding antibiotic prescribing tend to trump written guidelines.  
Apart from the role of professional norms, we also take interest in how private 
behavior regarding antibiotics may influence doctors’ antibiotic prescribing. While 
the literature on why doctors sometimes fail to implement evidence points to the 
role of private experiences (Freeman & Sweeney 2001), very few studies have 
investigated the extent to which doctors practice what they preach. An exception is 
a study indicating that general practitioners (GPs) would accept different types of 
medical treatment for themselves compared with what they would offer their 
patients (Gardner & Ogden, 2005). A study close to ours, and the only other paper 
we are aware of that investigates both private and professional preferences of 
physicians, is the one by Irvine et al., (2019). They investigated whether Scottish 
GPs’ time preferences for their own health (as private persons) differ from their 
professional time preferences for a patient (as physicians). Interestingly, they did 
not find any significant differences in the time preferences.1 However, they used a 
split sample design, while we sampled thee same physicians twice, each time in a 
specific role.  
There is also a literature on whether bureaucrats or public officials, in areas other 
than the medical, make decisions at work based on their private norms and 
                                                 
1 Other previous studies have investigated and compared physicians’ and patients’ private 
preferences. For example, Galizzi et al., (2016) found that there is no statistically significant 
difference in risk preferences in the health domain between patients and physicians, while physicians 
are more patient than their patients. 
5 
 
preferences or whether their private norms and preferences are just private. For 
example, Nilsson et al., (2004) found that bureaucrats working in the public sector 
(local government officials) often based their decisions on their private norms 
regarding environmental values. Eggert et al., (2018) found that bureaucrats at the 
Swedish Environmental Protection Agency were likely to bring their private 
preferences into their workplace.  
In this study, we investigate the possible connection between private and 
professional behavior by connecting responses from two separate waves of the 
survey panel. In the first wave we surveyed doctors in the panel about their privately 
held attitudes to and use of antibiotics, without making any connection to their 
profession. We connect their answers to the responses in the second doctor survey 
wave, in particular the hypothetical question about their willingness to treat 
tonsillitis with antibiotics. 
If doctors do bring their private behavior and attitudes regarding antibiotics to 
work, the question is whether this is good or bad news for prescription rates. Thus, 
before the analysis of determinants of doctors’ prescribing decisions, we shed light 
on the question of whether medical doctors’ and regular citizens’ attitudes and 
behaviors regarding antibiotics use and antibiotic resistance differ when both 
samples answered as private persons. With that comparison we can find whether 
the doctors´ antibiotics use and attitudes differ from others´ ditto, and if so, how. 
While many prior studies have investigated behaviors and attitudes concerning 
antibiotics among both prescribers and patients separately (Coenen et al., 2006; 
McNulty et al., 2007; Rodrigues et al., 2013, 2016), few studies have systematically 
compared the groups.  
 
2. Survey design and data 
The data from this paper comes from two separate waves of the Swedish online 
Citizen Panel, administered by the Laboratory of Opinion Research (LORE), 
University of Gothenburg, in Sweden. The first wave was carried out in 2018 and 





Survey wave 1 
The first wave of the survey was conducted March 22–April 16,  2018. The study 
consisted of two sub-samples. One sub-sample comprised 3,300 respondents pre-
stratified to mirror the Swedish population in terms of age, education, and gender. 
With a response rate of 58.2 percent, this sub-sample yielded 1,920 responses. The 
second sub-sample consisted of panelists in the Citizens panel who previously 
indicated that they worked in the healthcare sector. The total number of invited 
respondents in this group was 2,372. With a response rate of 82.8 percent, we ended 
up with 1,964 responses in total. Three-hundred-seventy-one respondents answered 
that they currently worked as physicians. In total, 357 of the 371 respondents 
answered all questions necessary to be included in the analysis. Importantly, in this 
first wave, both sub-samples, i.e., all respondents, were contacted as private persons 
and asked to answer as such. 
The first wave consisted of questions about the respondent’s contact with the 
healthcare sector, their use of antibiotics, and knowledge questions about antibiotics 
and antibiotic resistance. The survey also included questions about the respondent’s 
demographics and socio-economic status, as well as questions about trust in 
healthcare.  
In the present analysis we make use of a question about the willingness to abstain 
from treatment with antibiotics in a situation where this would not cause any serious 
threats to the individual. We asked the following question to both samples (citizens 
and physicians):  
 
“For a number of bacterial infections, for example tonsillitis, we know that the use 
of antibiotics will quicken your recovery. If you do not take antibiotics, you will 
remain ill for several additional days. How willing or unwilling are you to abstain 
from using antibiotics when possible, even if it means that you will be sick for some 
extra days?”  
 
The respondents were told to answer on a scale from 1 (very willing) to 5 (very 
unwilling). Similar questions have previously been used to investigate attitudes to 
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antibiotics using the Swedish Citizens panel (Rönnerstrand and Andersson Sundell, 
2015; Robertson et al., 2018; Carlsson et al., 2019). 
 
Survey wave 2  
The second wave of the survey was carried out December 11, 2019–January 16, 
2020. The target was the same 371 medical doctors who had completed the 
questionnaire in the first wave in 2018. A screening question asked them to verify 
that they still works as physicians. In total, 287 verified this and completed the 
survey (response rate = 77.4%).  
Apart from background questions related to education, employment, and 
professional experience, the topic of this survey was attitudes to antibiotics and 
antibiotic resistance, clinical guidelines, prescribing patterns among colleagues, 
and personal experience of prescribing antibiotics.  
In particular, the survey included a question mirroring the wave 1 question about 
willingness to abstain from taking antibiotics. However, the question in wave 2 was 
focused on physicians’ decisions to treat tonsillitis in patients with antibiotics: 
 
 “For a number of bacterial infections, for example tonsillitis, we know that 
prescribing antibiotics might quicken a patient´s recovery. If you do not prescribe 
antibiotics, there is a risk that a patient will remain ill for several additional days. 
How willing or unwilling are you as a physician to abstain from prescribing 
antibiotics when possible, even if it means that a patient will remain sick for some 
extra days?”  
 
The respondents were instructed to answer on a scale from 1 (very willing) to 5 
(very unwilling). 
We also used a similar question, with the same answer scale (1–5), to capture 
beliefs about others behavior considering from abstaining antibiotics as a private 
person and other physicians not prescribing antibiotics. For example, in the case of 




“How willing or unwilling do you think other physicians are to abstain from 
prescribing antibiotics when possible, even if it means that a patient will remain 
sick for some extra days?” 
 
3. Conceptual model and econometric analysis 
3.1 Prescription behavior 
We build on the literature of treatment choice and physicians’ agency (Ellis and 
McGuire, 1986; Chandra et al., 2012) to illustrate how doctors make prescription 
decisions and how these decisions depend on factors such as patient benefit, 
prescribing norms, and the risk of development of antibiotic resistance, but also 
privately held attitudes about antibiotics use. 
Let us illustrate with a prescriber k who can choose between two treatments 𝑖 =
{𝑎, 𝑛𝑎}, where the first is to prescribe antibiotics and the second is to not prescribe 
antibiotics. A treatment i results in a benefit to the patient, 𝐵𝑖, which is a function 
of factors such as health status (X) for patient j, 𝑋𝑗. In addition, a treatment results 
in a set of factors that the physician directly or indirectly cares about. These are 
factors related to the healthcare center and the relationship with the patient. 𝑉𝑖 
denotes the value of these factors for the physician A treatment also results in a 
social cost, 𝑆𝑖. In our case, the focus is on antibiotic resistance and the social cost 
is therefore only relevant for the treatment with antibiotics. Therefore, the social 
cost parameter is not included when i=na, e.g., when the physician decides not to 
prescribe antibiotics.2 Third, we assume that the physician cares about a treatment 
norm (N) among their peers (Manski, 1993; Kwon & Jun, 2015). In particular, we 
assume that there is a negative utility from deviating from the norm, where the norm 
is the common choice among physicians (see e.g. Broom et al., 2016), indicated by 
𝑖−̅𝑘. The utility of the physician, 𝑊𝑘, consists of these three factors and an error 
term capturing other factors. We assume that utility is linear in these factors so that 
                                                 
2 This is a simplification, and it is easy to imagine situations where there are social costs of not 
prescribing antibiotics, when antibiotics should have been prescribed. 
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we can write the utility of prescriber k in the cases where he/she decides to prescribe 
and not prescribe antibiotics as: 
𝑊𝑘(𝑖 = 𝑎) = 𝑉𝑎 + 𝛽𝑘𝐵𝑎(𝑋𝑗) − 𝛾𝑘𝑆𝑎 + 𝛿𝑘𝑁(𝑖𝑘, 𝑖−̅𝑘) + 𝑘𝑎 
𝑊𝑘(𝑖 = 𝑛𝑎) = 𝑉𝑛𝑎 + 𝛽𝑘𝐵𝑛𝑎(𝑋𝑗) + 𝛿𝑘𝑁(𝑖𝑘, 𝑖?̅?−𝑘) + 𝑘𝑛𝑎, 
respectively, where 𝛽𝑘 is a measure of the weight the physician puts on the benefit 
of the patient, 𝛾𝑘is the weight put on the social cost of the treatment, and 𝛿𝑘 is the 
weight put on acting in accordance or against the norm. The probability that the 
physician chooses the treatment without antibiotics is then: 
𝑃[𝑖 = 𝑛𝑎] = 𝑃[𝑉𝑛𝑎 + 𝛽𝑘𝐵𝑛𝑎(𝑋𝑗) + 𝛿𝑘𝑁(𝑛𝑎𝑘, 𝑖?̅?−𝑘) + 𝑘𝑛𝑎 > 𝑉𝑎 + 𝛽𝑘𝐵𝑎(𝑋𝑗) −
𝛾𝑘𝑆𝑎 + 𝛿𝑘𝑁(𝑎𝑘, 𝑖?̅?−𝑘) + 𝑘𝑎] = 𝑃[∆𝑉 + 𝛽𝑘∆𝐵(𝑋𝑗) + 𝛾𝑘𝑆𝑎 + 𝛿𝑘[𝑁(𝑛𝑎𝑘, 𝑖?̅?−𝑘) −
𝑁(𝑎𝑘 , 𝑖?̅?−𝑘)] > 𝜂𝑘], 
where Δ𝑉 is the difference in benefit to the physician between the two treatments,  
Δ𝐵 the difference in patient benefit between the two treatments, and 𝜂𝑘 the 
difference in error terms. Thus, the probability of choosing the treatment without 
antibiotics depends on the difference in benefits for the physician and patient 
between the two treatments, the social cost of prescribing antibiotics and the cost 
of deviating from the norm, the weights that the individual physician puts on these 
three elements, and a set of unobservable factors. Note that with this formulation, a 
physician can decide not to prescribe antibiotics even if the difference in benefits is 
negative. The probability of not prescribing antibiotics is increasing in the benefit 
difference and the social cost. It also increases if other physicians, too, are more 
likely not to prescribe antibiotics.  
What about guidelines? The prescribing of antibiotics according to guidelines 
enhances the overall quality of the prescribing (Oliveira et al., 2020). Therefore, 
strategies to increase compliance with guidelines are crucial in efforts to tackle 
antibiotic resistance. There is a vast literature on why clinicians do not prescribe 
according to guidelines (O´Connor et al., 2018; Rodrigues et al., 2013; Reyes-
Morales et al., 2009; Hamm et al., 1996), and patient expectations to obtain 
medications (see, e.g., Cockburn and Pit, 1997; Macfarlane et al., 1997; Coenen et 
al., 2006; Björkman et al., 2011), time pressure, and uncertainty of the best clinical 
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management are factors often highlighted. There are several ways to let the role of 
guidelines enter in our framework. The first is that they give information about the 
benefits for the patients and the social costs of the treatment choices. That is, in the 
standard case, the physician actually does not know the true values of B and S, and 
guidelines provide information about that. With this perspective, the impact of the 
guidelines depends on the initial expectations and information. One would therefore 
have to look at very specific cases to understand the effect of guidelines, and in 
particular know the purpose of the guidelines. Another way to think about 
guidelines is that they directly affect the weights in the utility function. Again, 
exactly how depends on the purpose of a guideline. Finally, one could also see 
guidelines as something providing information about what others do, and that the 
provision of guidelines would increase the cost of deviating from this norm.  
One interesting aspect of the model we explore in this paper is to what extent the 
privately held attitudes about the use of antibiotics and own behavior affects 
prescription behavior. To investigate this, we include the physicians’ own 
antibiotics use and their willingness to abstain from taking antibiotics as additional 
explanations of prescription behavior. The probability that a doctor prescribes 
antibiotics is now expressed as 
𝑃[𝑖 = 𝑛𝑎] = 𝑃[∆𝑉 + 𝛽𝑘∆𝐵(𝑋𝑗) + 𝛾𝑘𝑆𝑎 + 𝛿𝑘[𝑁(𝑛𝑎𝑘, 𝑖?̅?−𝑘) − 𝑁(𝑎𝑘, 𝑖?̅?−𝑘)] +
𝜃𝑘𝑀𝑘 > 𝜂𝑘], 
where 𝑀𝑘 is the privately held attitude about the importance of not prescribing 
antibiotics.  
To investigate prescription behavior, we use the question about the likelihood to 
prescribe antibiotics posed in the survey. We use an OLS model where the 
dependent variable is a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates that a physician is very 
likely to prescribe antibiotics and 5 that a physician is very unlikely to do so. In the 
first model we include various aspects of being a medical doctor, namely whether 
a physician has regularly prescribed antibiotics, is a GP, and has received their 
medical license from Sweden or abroad, as well as a dummy capturing those who 
have long experience of their work, i.e., those who have worked as a doctor for at 
least 20 years. In Model 2, we add socio-economic controls such as gender, the size 
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of the city a physician lives in, and self-rated health status, as well as a dummy 
variable capturing whether the medical doctor is worried about antibiotics 
resistance. In Model 3, we add variables capturing their knowledge and relation to 
medical guidelines, and their perception about other doctors’ willingness to abstain 
from prescribing antibiotics. Finally, in Model 4 we add two variables relating to 
the personal behavior of a doctor: willingness to abstain from using antibiotics as a 
patient and use of antibiotics in the past 12 months. 
 
4. Results 
In the first wave survey, doctors and citizens expressed their willingness to 
abstain from taking antibiotics and reported on their use of antibiotics. Do 
remember that at this stage, all respondents answered the survey as private persons 
and not as professionals, and therefore we interpret their answers as such private 
persons. In this dataset, we have 357 doctors. After comparing doctors and ordinary 
citizens, we investigate the behavior of doctors as prescribers. We then primarily 
rely on the data from the second wave, where 266 of the 357 doctors who answered 
the first survey also completed the second survey where they were asked to respond 
as professional prescribers.  
 
4.1 Doctors as private persons versus citizens  
Based on the first wave survey, we investigate whether a person has used 
antibiotics in the past 12 months, is willing to abstain from using antibiotics in the 
case of a non-life-threatening respiratory illness although doing so will increase the 
number of sick days, and beliefs about other people’s willingness to abstain from 
using antibiotics in the same situation. Table 1 shows the distribution of responses 





Table 1. Distribution of responses for regular citizens and doctors as private 
persons. Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 Doctors as private persons  Citizens  
 Willing to abstain 
from using 
antibiotics 
Belief about other 
people’s willingness 
to abstain 
Willing to abstain from 
using antibiotics 
Belief about other 
people’s willingness 
to abstain 
Very unwilling 8.5% 19% 5% 12% 
Unwilling 22% 52% 14% 52% 
Neither 12% 16% 16% 20% 
Willing 34% 12% 35% 14% 









Have used antibiotics 
during the last 12 months 
29%  20%  
Number of obs. 356 355 1,918 1,916 
 
The distribution of the extent of willingness not to use antibiotics is wide, with a 
considerable share of individuals in both samples who are willing to abstain. 
However, there are significant differences between the samples. We can reject the 
null hypothesis that the distributions of responses are equal between doctors and 
citizens (two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test; p-values<0.000 for all comparisons). 
Nineteen percent of the citizens are very or quite unwilling to abstain from using 
antibiotics, while among doctors this share is about 31 percent. Thus, doctors are 
less likely to abstain from using antibiotics. Doctors as private persons are also less 
optimistic than others about other people´s willingness to abstain (rank-sum test; p-
value < 0.000).3 Finally, a significantly larger share of doctors (29% vs. 20%) have 
used antibiotics in the last 12 months compared with the general public (two-sample 
proportions test; p-value < 0.000).  
However, doctors differ from the general public in terms of many socio-
economic and personal characteristics. In the appendix (Table A1), we report 
descriptive statistics of the sample of doctors and the sample of the general public. 
As expected, doctors are on average more educated and have a higher income than 
                                                 
3 Both groups are significantly more positive about their own willingness to abstain than other 
people´s willingness to do so: 71 percent of doctors believe that other people are not willing to 
abstain, while 64 percent of the general public believes this. The differences in distributions are 
statistically significant in both cases (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-values< 0.000). 
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the general public. Moreover, Table A2 in the appendix shows a comparison 
between the doctors included in our sample and doctors in general in Sweden.4  
Doctors also work professionally with antibiotics and an average doctor should 
therefore be more knowledgeable about correct antibiotics use and antibiotic 
resistance than an average ordinary citizen. In the appendix (Table A3), we present 
responses to a set of questions about being worried about antibiotic resistance and 
the results from the set of knowledge questions about the use of antibiotics that we 
included in the survey. As expected, doctors have better knowledge about 
antibiotics, with almost 100 percent correct answers. However, the difference 
between them and regular citizens is rather small, probably because of the high level 
of public knowledge (around 89% correct answers). Doctors are also more worried 
about antibiotic resistance, and feel that they are well informed. All these 
differences are statistically significant at the conventional level. 
As already mentioned, doctors are more educated and have a higher income 
compared with the general public. They are also more likely to have children, and 
self-report a higher health status, and there are fewer women in the sample of 
doctors compared with the sample of the general public. The differences in attitudes 
and behavior could be due to these differences in observable characteristics. Hence, 
the comparison between the doctors and the general public should take into 
consideration that the two groups differ in many ways. To control for differences 
in observable characteristics, we apply a propensity score matching method (Joffe 
and Rosenbaum, 1999; Rubin and Thomas, 2000). We create a matched sample 
from the general public using the nearest neighbor method with 1,000 bootstrap 
draws, where the treatment variable is being a doctor.5 We base the matching on 
the following characteristics: university education, working full time, income level, 
area of residence, having children, and gender. This results in a sample with 836 
                                                 
4 If we compare individual and work-related characteristics of the doctors in our sample (n=266) 
with doctors in Sweden in general, we can observe some differences and some similarities (Table 
A1 in Appendix). In terms of the share of GPs and mean age, our sample matches the total population 
of doctors very well. However, we have an overrepresentation of male doctors and doctors who 
obtained their medical license from Sweden  
5 The propensity score ranges from 0.091 to 0.8 
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observations (356 doctors and 480 from the general public).6 We then estimate 
regression models based on this matched sample, and then add a set of control 
variables capturing own health status, knowledge about antibiotics, and being 
worried about antibiotic resistance. We estimate three models where the dependent 
variable in model 1 is whether a respondent has taken any antibiotics in the last 12 
months, in model 2 it is the willingness to abstain from using antibiotics, and in 
model 3 it is the individual´s beliefs about others’ willingness to abstain from using 
antibiotics. Table 2 below shows results from the matched regression models. 
  
                                                 
6 A probit model where the dependent variable is one if a respondent is a doctor shows that doctors 
are less likely to be females, more likely to have a higher income, and more likely to have children 
than the general public. The results are available on request. 
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Table 2. Regression results (OLS), dependent variables are having taken 
antibiotics the last 12 months, own willingness to abstain from antibiotics, and 
belief about other people’s willingness to do so. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Matched sample. 
 Taken antibiotics in 
the past 12 months 
Willingness to 
abstain 
Belief about other 
























































































Number of obs. 833 834 833 
Adjusted R2 0.039 0.085 0.019 
***<0.001, **<0.01, and *<0.05 significance levels 
      
Our main interest is the size and statistical significance of the dummy variable 
Doctor. We see that it is sizeable and statistically significant in all three models. 
The likelihood of having taken antibiotics in the past 12 months is 15 percentage 
points higher for a doctor, and the willingness to abstain from taking antibiotics is 
0.43 units lower. Compared with the mean value in the matched sample of 3.58 (on 
a scale from 1 to 5), this is a sizeable effect. Similarly, the belief about other 
people’s willingness to abstain in the same situation is about 0.22 units lower for a 
doctor. The mean value for the belief about others is 2.34 in the matched sample. 
Among the other control variables, only self-reported health status is correlated 
16 
 
with antibiotics use: a better health status is associated with a lower likelihood of 
antibiotics use in the last 12 months. A better health status is also associated with a 
higher willingness to abstain from taking antibiotics. Respondents who are worried 
about antibiotic resistance are also more willing to abstain.  
 
4.2 Doctors as private persons and as prescribers 
By using the second wave of the survey, we first compare the same sample of 
doctors in two different roles, i.e., as a private person and as a prescriber.7 Table 
A4 of the appendix shows the distributions of answers to the main questions 
concerning antibiotics use and prescribing for doctors both as private persons and 
as prescribers. We find that the distribution of the answers to the question about 
own willingness to abstain from using antibiotics is not statistically different from 
the distribution for the question about abstaining from prescribing antibiotics 
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test; p-value = 0.947). The mean values of the responses 
(based on an ordinal scale from 1 to 5) are actually very similar between the two 
questions and not significantly different from each other. Thus, the private and 
professional norms are on average very similar.8 On the other hand, distributions to 
the questions about own behavior and beliefs about others´ behavior when it comes 
to abstaining from antibiotics as a private person are significantly different. 
Similarly, the own prescription behavior as a physician compared to beliefs about 
other physicians´ prescription behavior are also significantly different from each 
other. (Wilcoxon signed-rank test; p-value < 0.000 for both comparisons). In both 
questions, physicians in our sample believe that they are more likely to abstain from 
taking antibiotics and prescribing antibiotics than what others do.  Thus, we do not 
find that physicians in our sample think that others in general have similar 
preferences as themselves considering both antibiotics use and antibiotics 
prescriptions. 
                                                 
7 Our sample of doctors now consists of those who responded in both the first and the second wave 
of our survey. Thus, the sample size has decreased from 357 to 266 observations. 
8 A Wilcoxon signed-rank test shows a significant difference in the distribution of the answers to 
the question about others willingness to abstain (p-value= 0.000), but that comparison is less relevant 
since it compares beliefs about other people’s willingness to abstain from using antibiotics with 
beliefs about other doctors’ willingness to prescribe antibiotics.  
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We now turn to the regression analyses and investigate what can explain a 
doctor´s decision not to prescribe antibiotics to a patient in the case of tonsillitis. 
Table 4 shows results from OLS regression models, with the decision to abstain 
from prescribing antibiotics as the dependent variable.9 
 
Table 4. Regression results (OLS) where the dependent variable is doctors’ 
decision to abstain from prescribing antibiotics for a patient.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Regularly prescribe antibiotics -0.017 -0.027 -0.000 0.010 
 (0.160) (0.159) (0.128) (0.127) 
Medical license from abroad -0.246 -0.254 -0.443* -0.408 
 (0.289) (0.289) (0.224) (0.222) 
Long experience -0.323* -0.249 -0.190 -0.137 
 (0.161) (0.165) (0.130) (0.130) 
General practitioner 0.723*** 0.749*** 0.275 0.213 
 (0.206) (0.205) (0.164) (0.164) 
Negative reactions when not prescribing -0.536 -0.556 0.116 0.021 
 (0.363) (0.362) (0.286) (0.287) 
Female  0.021 -0.166 -0.137 
  (0.159) (0.123) (0.122) 
Big city  -0.057 -0.067 -0.025 
  (0.148) (0.114) (0.114) 
Health status  0.157 0.112 0.075 
  (0.115) (0.090) (0.094) 
Worry about resistance  0.257* 0.170* 0.130 
  (0.107) (0.084) (0.084) 
Perceived willingness of other doctors    0.808*** 0.755*** 
not to prescribe   (0.066) (0.068) 
Follow guidelines strictly   0.343** 0.301* 
   (0.128) (0.128) 
Stated good knowledge about guidelines   0.015 0.032 
   (0.131) (0.130) 
Willingness to abstain as private person    0.136** 
    (0.052) 
Taken antibiotics past 12 months    -0.078 
    (0.141) 
Constant 3.646*** 2.020** -0.133 -0.139 
 (0.152) (0.642) (0.532) (0.563) 
Observations 230 230 230 229 
R-squared 0.072 0.106 0.477 0.498 
Standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
For Model 1, we see that GPs are much more likely not to prescribe antibiotics: 
the willingness to abstain from prescribing antibiotics is 0.72 units higher if the 
doctor is a GP. The mean value of abstaining is 3.5 (on a 1–5 scale) among all 
                                                 
9 We report estimates from standard regression models. All models have also been estimated as 
ordered logit models, and the results in terms of statistical significance are very similar.  
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doctors, so the effect of being a GP is large. How regularly a doctor prescribes 
antibiotics does not have a significant effect, but the experience in terms of number 
of years has a negative effect on the likelihood of not prescribing antibiotics.  
The large impact of being a GP persists in Model 2, where we include individual 
characteristics. In this model, those who are worried about antibiotic resistance are 
also more likely not to prescribe antibiotics. The gender of the doctor does not have 
a statistically significant impact on the willingness to prescribe.10 
 For Model 3, where we add the perceived treatment norm, i.e., beliefs about 
other doctors´ willingness not to prescribe and whether they strictly follow 
guidelines, we see that there is no longer a statistically significant direct effect of 
being a GP11. On the other hand, doctors with a license from abroad are less willing 
to abstain from prescribing antibiotics.12 Most importantly, there is a strong positive 
correlation between own willingness not to prescribe and the treatment norm, i.e., 
the perception of other doctors’ willingness not to prescribe. Interestingly, those 
who state that they strictly follow guidelines are more likely to abstain from 
prescribing antibiotics. Thus, both the perceived norm and the guidelines seem to 
decrease the likelihood of prescribing antibiotics.  
In Model 4, we include the willingness of a doctor to abstain from using 
antibiotics as a private person. Since there is a statistically significant coefficient 
for willingness to abstain as a private person, this is an indication of an influence 
of own behavior as a citizen on decision-making as a doctor. The size of the 
correlation for the perception of other doctors’ behavior remains largely the same 
in Model 4. Since the variables measuring the willingness to abstain as a private 
person and the perception of other doctor’s behavior are measured with the same 
scale, we can compare the coefficients with each other. The coefficient of 
                                                 
10 This indicates that our underrepresentation of female doctors (32% in the sample vs. 48% at 
national level, see Table A2 in the Appendix) does not bias our results. 
11 We also create interactions variables between being GP and our main variables capturing 
treatments norms and private attidues. All the interaction terms are insignificant indicating that GPs 
are not significantly different from other physicians in our sample, considering professional norms 
and private attitudes. 
12 Remembering that our sample has a lower share of doctors with a license from aboard (7% vs. 
28% at national level, see Table A2 in the Appendix), the impact of where the license was obtained 
could be an underestimation. 
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perceived behavior of other doctors is close to six times larger than the coefficient 
of willingness to abstain as a private person. Thus, we find that the professional 
norm measured as other doctors´ prescription behavior seems to be stronger than 
the private attitude regarding prescription of antibiotics.  
 
5. Conclusions and Discussion 
 
In the case of antibiotic prescribing, the simple principle-agent aspect of the 
relationship between patients and medical doctors is complicated by the collective 
dynamic of antibiotic resistance and the need to limit overall levels of antibiotic 
prescribing. In particular, the balancing of individual vs. collective interest in the 
prescribing decision gives rise to leeway for professional discretion that needs to 
be resolved in clinical practice Prior studies point to the difficulty of changing 
clinical practices, as concerns about the long-term consequences of antibiotic 
resistance fall short when compared with the short-them risk of the individual 
patients. By exploring the role of professional norms and private attitudes, this 
paper extends the knowledge about how doctors handle the prescribing dilemma.  
More specifically, this paper studies how professional treatment norms in the 
form of guidelines for correct antibiotics use and expectations of other medical 
doctors´ prescription behavior is linked to a doctor´s prescription behavior. In 
addition, we studied the connection between doctors’ prescribing behavior and their 
personal behavior and attitudes measured as own consumption of antibiotics and 
personal willingness to abstain from using antibiotics as a private person. This of 
course also begs the question, what are the determinants of doctors’ willingness to 
abstain from taking antibiotics as a private person, and are they similar or different 
compared with other citizens? As for the latter question, our results show that 
doctors differ from other citizens in that they consume significantly more antibiotics 
as private persons than the general public and they are on average less willing to 
abstain from taking antibiotics.  
When it comes to doctors´ professional role, there is a strong correlation between 
a doctor´s decision not to prescribe and 1) the treatment norm, i.e., the perception 
of the prescription decisions of other physicians and 2) adherence to antibiotics 
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guidelines. We interpret the connection between own prescription decisions and the 
perceived prescribing among peers as the result of the norm set by what others do, 
but it is important to point out that we do not have a strict identification of such a 
causal relation. As others have pointed out (Sundvall et al., 2020), in order to 
improve the quality of prescribing of antibiotics, it is favorable to use peers, but 
also to take into consideration the impact of other healthcare categories, for example 
nurses (Strandberg et al., 2016). Our results also point to the importance of 
guidelines adherence, although the strategy to achieve this is challenging (Meeker 
et al., 2014; Oliveira et al., 2020). The findings of the influence from peers highlight 
the importance to choose properly to intervene on the individual prescriber or the 
prescribers sharing the same “antibiotic etiquette”.  Interventions on the individual 
level will fall short not taking into account the impact from peers. Besides, with 
respect to doctors’ different personal attitudes to prescribing, a tailored, individual 
intervention is challenging.  
The influence of the perceived prescribing decision of peers is interesting also 
in the light of previous studies on how the social norm set by senior doctors often 
trumps written prescription guidelines (Broom et al., 2016). In their study of 
antibiotic prescribing at an Australian hospital, Broom and co-workers show that 
deviations from existing guidelines – often motived by adjustments to “local 
demands” – were often the result of the prescribing norm of groups at the hospital. 
For many junior doctors, senior doctors’ practices were much more important than 
the minimal reputational stake of overprescribing. The present study extends these 
findings by indicating that peers may influence doctors’ prescribing decision also 
in the absence of the risk of social disapproval. 
In addition to the role of professional norms, we also found a strong connection 
between private antibiotics behavior and antibiotic prescribing. Physicians who 
were less willing to abstain from using antibiotics as private persons also prescribe 
more, and vice versa. A paper by Nilsson et al., (2004) points to the influence of 
the private on the professional: bureaucrats tend to bring their private norms to 
work. Other studies have instead found that private and professional preferences of 
physicians (Irvine et al., 2019) or of bureaucrats (Eggert et al., 2018) are very much 
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the same. Irvine et al., (2019) also showed that doctors perceive a health condition 
as more severe when experienced by a patient rather than themselves, and conclude 
that this is important since a medical treatment recommendation may vary 
depending on whether the GP is using professional or private health condition 
values. The connection between physicians’ professional and private behaviors is 
therefore interesting both from a policy perspective and theoretically. Awareness 
of the importance of private attitudes and behaviors among physicians should be 
acknowledged, especially in interventions to encourage proper antibiotic 
prescribing. However, when comparing the private attitudes and professional 
norms, we find that the professional norm in terms of expected peer behavior has a 
six time stronger impact than the private attitude towards antibiotic prescription. 
The conclusions of this paper should be viewed in light of the Swedish context. 
Overprescribing of antibiotics remains a problem in Sweden, but compared with 
other European counties, and due to a steady decrease in antibiotic prescribing in 
the past decades, the present level of antibiotic use is low. One reason for this is the 
early introduction of antibiotic stewardship programs, including treatment 
guidelines (Mölstad et al., 2017). It is likely that the awareness of antibiotic 
resistance is higher among Swedish doctors and that they prescribe more in line 
with what is clinically motivated, compared with colleagues in other counties. This 
implies that the influence of norms may differ between the Swedish context and 
other country settings.  
In general, the more non-medical factors influence prescribing, the more space 
there is for the influence of private attitudes regarding antibiotic prescribing. 
Furthermore, in the context of large variation in prescribing patterns among 
individual doctors, which is likely in a high-prescribing setting, adherence to 
guidelines may be an even more decisive factor. But while both these factors may 
suggest that norms may matter even more in settings other than the Swedish, the 
influence of the prescription habits of peers may point in the opposite direction. 
This stigma of non-conformity with prescribing norms among peers is likely to be 
higher in a setting where the awareness of antibiotic resistance is widespread. 
Nevertheless, a study on the influence of professional and private norms on 
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antibiotic prescribing in a high-prescribing context could complement the findings 
in this paper.  
Another factor to consider is how the hypothetical prescribing situation utilized 
in this paper compares to “real world” prescribing. Our research strategy removes 
all case-specific details, as well as the interpersonal, relational aspect of prescribing, 
known to influence the decision-making of doctors (Strivers 2002). But the other 
side of the coin is that holding these factors constant makes is possible to consider 
novel explanatory factors, such as the link between private norms and antibiotic 
prescribing.  
To conclude, the current paper demonstrates the importance of norms for 
antibiotic prescribing. Using data from a unique two-wave survey panel consisting 
of Swedish doctors, we show that the prescription behavior of peers, prescription 
policy, as well as personal attitudes regarding antibiotics all matter for what doctors 
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Table A1. Socio-economic characteristics of doctors and regular citizens. The 
whole samples; standard errors in parentheses. 







Regularly prescribing  =1 if a physician regularly prescribes antibiotics (weekly).  0.47  
General practitioner =1 if a physician is a general practitioner.  0.14  
License from abroad =1 if a physician obtained their medical license from 
abroad and not in Sweden. 
 0.07  
Long experience =1 if a physician has worked over 20 years as a medical 
doctor. 
 0.42  
Female  =1 if respondent is female. 0.35 0.32 0.48 






University = if university education > 3 years 1.00 1.00 0.25 




Large city =if respondent lives in a large city. 0.43 0.43 0.38 
Heath status = subjective rating of own health status where 1 is very 













Well informed about 
resistance 
=1 if a respondent feels well informed about antibiotic 
resistance 
0.92  0.34 
Worried about 
resistance 
= scale between 1 and 4 where 1 means do not agree at all 







Willingness to abstain 
as a citizen 
= scale between 1 and 5, where 1 is very unwilling and 5 is 







Willingness to abstain 
from prescribing 
= scale between 1 and 5, where 1 is very unwilling and 5 is 







     
Belief about other 








Taken antibiotics past 
12 months 
 0.29 0.26 0.20 
Number of obs.  357 266 1,916 
 
Table A2. Work-related and demographic characteristics of doctors in sample and 
all doctors in Sweden 2017 




=1 if a physician is a general practitioner. 0.14 0.16 
License from 
abroad 
=1 if a physician obtained medical license 
abroad and not in Sweden. 
0.07 0.28 
Female  =1 if respondent is female. 0.32 0.48 
Age category = 1 < 50 year 0.54 0.51 
Number of obs.  266 43,225 
Note: Data on age, gender, and share of general practitioners comes from the Swedish Board of 
Health and Welfare. Data on medical license from abroad comes the OECD. 
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Table A3. Mean values and p-values of knowledge/worriedness questions. Standard 
deviations in parentheses.  
Variable Doctors Citizens P-value, H0: 
Doctors = Publica 






















The more antibiotics we use, the more 






Number of obs. 357 1,920  
a Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test (categorical variables) and Proportion tests (dummy 
variables) 
 
Table A4. Distribution of responses for doctors as private persons versus doctors 
as prescribers. Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 Doctor as prescriber Doctor as private person 
 Willing not to 
prescribe 
antibiotics 
Belief about others’ 








Very unwilling 3% 1% 7% 16% 
Unwilling 21% 32% 22% 56% 
Neither 19% 33% 12% 14% 
Willing 36% 29% 35% 13% 









Number of obs. 254 256 266 265 
 
